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A B S T R A C T
Where regulation is weak, medicine transactions can be characterised by uncertainty over the drug quality and
efficacy, with buyers shouldering the greater burden of risk in exchanges that are typically asymmetric. Drawing
on in-depth interviews (N=220) and observations of medicine transactions, plus interviews with regulators
(N= 20), we explore how people in Ghana negotiate this uncertainty and come to trust a medicine enough to
purchase or ingest it. We identify two mechanisms – attempts to mitigate uncertainty through seeking observable
signs of quality and attempts to reduce informational asymmetry – that underpin cognitive assessments of a
medicine's trustworthiness. However, these ‘cognitive’ forms of trust assessment have limited traction where
uncertainty is high and trustworthiness remains unknowable, so a third mechanism comes into play: one based
on affective relationships within which transactions are socially embedded. Even these, however, cannot
eliminate uncertainty, because of the dispersed and under-regulated nature of wider supply chains. In conclu-
sion, we reflect on the need for careful research on actors' practices and decision-making across supply chains to
inform more effective policy and regulation.
1. Introduction
1.1. Uncertainty in medicine quality
James, a 22-year-old high-school graduate, lives in in a village in
southern Ghana, some 12km from the nearest clinic. He is complaining
about the local drugstore, which is rarely open because the owner is busy
working on his farm. The drugstore is poorly stocked and some medicines
have expired. The alternative, when the situation is urgent, is to buy from
itinerant peddlers who sell medicines at the weekly market and door-to-
door. However, James distrusts the peddlers: he doesn't know where their
medicines come from and, despite their ‘sweet words,’ he suspects they
are not very knowledgeable. James always checks the expiry date, al-
though he has heard that unscrupulous dealers repackage expired med-
icines or amend the date. He also checks the manufacturer's details,
comparing brand numbers on the external and internal packaging. For
unpackaged pills, James examines the markings on the medicine itself
(‘paracetamol should have PC’), and rubs the pill between his fingers,
explaining, ‘If it crumbles, you know it's old.’ He is suspicious of very
cheap medicines and tries to avoid those purporting to come from India
or China. Ultimately, though, James' options are limited. Unless he can
find the bus fare to town, he has do make do with what is locally
available. [Author's field-notes, 17/5/2016]
James’ concerns are well-founded given the global proliferation of
poor-quality medicines that have either been deliberately falsified,
manufactured in substandard conditions with insufficient quality con-
trol, and/or have deteriorated post-manufacture (Hamilton et al., 2016;
Tremblay, 2013; WHO, 2017a). The prevalence of poor-quality medi-
cines is notoriously difficult to ascertain, and estimates are often dis-
puted (Almuzaini et al., 2013). A recent comprehensive review by the
World Health Organisation reported that over 10 percent of medicines
in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) contain too little active
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ingredient, with antibiotics and anti-malarials particularly vulnerable
(WHO, 2017a, 2017b).
Ghana has relatively well-functioning regulatory systems compared
with other countries in the region. However, as interviewees from the
Ghana Food and Drugs Authority (GFDA) told us, they remain under-
resourced and lack the capacity to control effectively the supply of
poor-quality medicines, especially beyond major urban centres. For
example, when we interviewed them they had eight staff to do all the
inspections in Central Region which has a population of over 2.2 mil-
lion (Ghana Statistical Service 2013). Recent studies have reported that
20–40 percent of anti-malarials and antibiotics sold in official outlets in
Ghana fail quality standards (<= 80% of active ingredient: Kaur et al.,
2016; Fadeyi et al., 2015; Tivura et al., 2016). Globally, poor-quality
anti-malarial and antibiotic medicines are thought to be responsible for
more than 100,000 under-five deaths annually, concentrated in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Renschler et al., 2015; WHO, 2017b), in addition to
risks of accelerated antimicrobial resistance that arise through persis-
tent under-dosing (Dondorp et al., 2009; Newton et al., 2016; Brock
et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2017).
The WHO and other agencies have responded with efforts to
strengthen national regulatory capacity and reporting (Hamilton et al.,
2016; WHO, 2017a), while advising customers to source medicines only
from ‘trusted and licensed outlets’ and to scrutinise medicines carefully
before purchase ( Box 1). However, as James' experience illustrates,
sourcing from ‘trusted and licensed outlets’ is not always an option,
while the advice to discuss ‘adverse reactions’ with a ‘pharmacist,
doctor or other healthcare professional’ requires a level of access that is
unavailable for most Ghanaians. Moreover, as acknowledged in the
official advice, it is extraordinarily difficult to distinguish by eye a
good-quality medicine from a poor-quality one even for a trained
pharmacist, let alone a ‘lay’ purchaser.
In this context, we ask how consumers in Ghana manage uncertainty
in medicine quality, and how they come to trust enough to purchase and
ingest a medicine. We focus on private-sector retail outlets (formal and
informal), where the majority of people in Ghana (and other LMICs)
source essential medicines, where regulation is usually patchiest, and
where the ‘trust problems’ are greatest, since access to medicines is
unmediated by a clinician. We begin by outlining some key features of
private-sector pharmaceutical supply in Ghana and of medicine trans-
actions in general, situating our work within a small but growing body
of research on trust in healthcare in high-risk, low-regulation en-
vironments beyond the Global North.
Source: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/
Accessed on 05/06/2019.
1.2. Private sector medicine outlets and supply chains in Ghana
In Ghana (as in many other LMICs), private sector retail outlets
constitute the primary source of essential medicines for most of the
population. Although Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS) was intended to facilitate access to primary healthcare and es-
sential medicines, in 2016, about 60 percent of the population were
uninsured and thus obliged to pay out-of-pocket for essential medicines
sourced predominantly from the private sector (Alhassan et al., 2016;
Vandam, 2016). Medicine shortages and stock-outs at government
health facilities mean that even those covered by NHIS have to resort to
private-sector outlets for essential medicines, where availability tends
to be better (Mackintosh and Mujinja, 2010; Palafox et al., 2014;
Nicholson, 2013; Seidman and Atun, 2017). Moreover, especially in
rural areas, the distance and cost of travelling to the nearest govern-
ment-sector health facility can be prohibitive, and medicines may well
be out of stock there.
Ghana has a huge variety of ‘private-sector outlets’, operating with
varying degrees of regulation, legality and formality. These range from
large, up-market, licensed pharmacies in city centres, to smaller over-
the-counter (OTC) medicine stores (commonly known as ‘drug stores’ or
‘chemical shops’), to grocery stores selling basic medicines and itinerant
peddlers like those in James' village (Hampshire et al., 2011, 2015).
The informal sector in Ghana is smaller than in neighbouring franco-
phone countries (Baxerres and Le Hesran, 2011); nonetheless it is es-
timated that unregulated drugs comprise 10–20 percent of all medicines
in circulation (Seiter and Gyansa-Lutterodt, 2009). As Baxerres (2014)
notes, medicines sold in informal outlets are not necessarily of poor
quality, but they fall outside the scrutiny of Food and Drugs Authorities.
About 30 percent of Ghana's medicine supply is manufactured lo-
cally, with the remainder imported mostly from India and China
(Akomea et al., 2014). Ghana's importation and distribution channels
have been characterised as chaotic, with weak distribution networks
and fragmented competition (McCabe et al., 2009). Multiple actors
operate at different levels – importers, distributors, wholesalers, re-
tailers, sales reps, and many others – with significant vertical con-
solidation (as the same company manufactures, wholesales and retails,
for example) and horizontal transfer. ‘Leakage’ of medicines from
public to private sectors has been observed while other medicines move
between formal and informal sectors as they criss-cross geographical
and regulatory boundaries (Dizon-Ross et al., 2017). These character-
istics make pharmaceutical supply chains vulnerable to penetration of
poor-quality medicines and to lapses in appropriate standards of storage
and transportation (Tremblay, 2013; Patouillard et al., 2010).
1.3. Buying medicines: an asymmetrical economic transaction
A medicinal transaction occurs when a buyer and seller exchange
money for medicine. In general, the buyer assumes that the product will
do what it says it will do on the packet, and that the seller will act with
integrity, dispensing a product appropriate to the condition. However,
uncertainty about medicine quality creates three important conditions.
First, sellers usually know more about medicine quality than buyers
do. The difficulties of distinguishing an effective medicine from an in-
effective one means that (unlike some other commodities), neither
buyer not seller can necessarily be certain about quality (Mackintosh
and Mujinja, 2010; Mackintosh et al., 2018). However, retailers usually
have more information on the source of a medicine than a buyer (albeit
not necessarily of the full supply chain). Even retailers without formal
Box 1
WHO guidance on identifying a substandard or falsified medical product
Some falsified medical products are almost visually identical to the genuine product and very difficult to detect. However, many can be
identified by:
• examining the packaging for condition, spelling mistakes or grammatical errors;
• checking the manufacture and expiry dates and ensuring any details on the outer packaging match the dates shown on the inner packaging;
• ensuring the medicine looks correct, is not discoloured, degraded or has an unusual smell;
• discussing with your pharmacist, doctor or other healthcare professional as soon as possible if you suspect the product is not working
properly or you have suffered an adverse reaction; and
• reporting suspicious medical products to your National Medicines Regulatory Authority.
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qualifications typically have more knowledge and experience than the
public, enabling them to make more informed decisions.
Second, the consequences of getting it wrong are typically greater
for buyers, who risk their health (or that of a loved one), than for
sellers. The latter may risk regulatory penalties and/or reputational
damage for selling poor-quality medicines, but in practice this very
rarely happens in Ghana, owing to poor detection/reporting systems
and an unwillingness to report suspect products/people (discussed
below). This asymmetry of risk places a much larger burden on the
buyer to make the right decision than on the seller.
Third, in Ghana, pharmaceutical medicines are typically bought
when someone is actually unwell (unlike herbal medicines, which tend
to be used prophylactically; see Hampshire et al., 2013). Being unwell
(or seeing a loved one unwell) can convey a sense of urgency to procure
treatment that puts the customer in a position of structural dis-
advantage vis-à-vis the seller, perhaps increasing her susceptibility to
the seller's interests (for example, shifting a more expensive or profit-
able product).
Private-sector medicine transactions in situations of relatively low
regulatory capacity and enforcement thus occur within a context of
uncertainty, informational asymmetry and buyer vulnerability. While
most medicine retailers may be competent and motivated by pro-social
desires to help, this cannot always be assumed; moreover, retailers may
also not have enough information to be certain about a medicine's
quality. Uncertainties, informational asymmetries and vulnerabilities
can also pervade transactions higher up supply chains, as retailers make
decisions about procurement, with less information on a medicine's
quality and provenance than their suppliers (Chaudhuri et al., 2010).
We ask how, in a practical sense, buyers of pharmaceutical medicines in
Ghana manage this uncertainty.
1.4. Trust in healthcare
Kenneth Arrow (1963) and Richard Titmuss (1970) noted the un-
certainties and asymmetries often inherent in healthcare. Trust be-
comes most salient where uncertainties are greatest. As Giddens (1990:
33) stated, ‘There would be no need to trust anyone whose activities
were continually visible and whose thought processes were transparent,
or to trust any system whose workings were wholly known and un-
derstood.’ It is generally accepted in the sociological literature that trust
is granted to those we find trustworthy, i.e. those who demonstrate
competence and integrity (see Cook and Gerbasi, 2009, for a review).
This formulation has underpinned the majority of research on trust in
healthcare, focused mostly on doctor-patient relationships in ‘Western’
settings (e.g. 2008; Calnan and Rowe, 2008; Mechanic and Meyer,
2000; Meyer and Ward, 2013), and/or surveys of generalised trust in
(North American and European) healthcare institutions (see reviews by
Gilson, 2003; Cook Karen and Stepanikova, 2009; and critiques by
Brhlikova et al., 2011; Ozawa and Sripad, 2013). In this work, trust and
trustworthiness are understood in the context of robust regulatory in-
stitutions and meaningful choice.
In recent years, research has increasingly included resource-poor
contexts, where inadequate service provision and financial barriers may
severely constrain choice (e.g. Birungi, 1998; Gilson et al., 2005;
Russell, 2005; Ozawa and Walker, 2011; Tibandebage and Mackintosh,
2005; Hampshire et al., 2017; Ackatia-Armah et al., 2016). This work
has highlighted the importance of social relationships and mutual un-
derstanding between healthcare providers and those seeking care
(Gilson, 2003; Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005:1385; Brhlikova
et al., 2011; Ecks and Basu, 2014). In settings where the risks and un-
certainties may be extraordinarily high (Rodrigues, 2016), some re-
searchers have questioned the premise that trustworthiness underpins
trust. They have highlighted the importance of living with rather than
seeking to eliminate uncertainty (Samimian and Rabinow, 2015;
Widger, 2017; Zin, 2016), and the need sometimes to “trust the un-
trustworthy” (Haas, 2016; Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005).
Following these approaches and referring to a transaction between
individuals, we define the act of trusting as the expectation that pur-
chasing or taking a medicine will do more good than harm, even if the
benefit is marginal. Below, we explore the cognitive and affective bases
underpinning the formation of trust in this type of interaction and the
limits of these processes in managing ‘deep’ uncertainty over medicine
quality.
2. Methods
This paper draws on nine months' fieldwork (May 2016–February
2017) conducted in Ghana by the authors and research assistants.
Fieldwork was conducted principally in Ghana's Central Region: Cape
Coast, the Regional capital, and several smaller settlements, with ad-
ditional fieldwork in Accra. We present data from 200 semi-structured
interviews with retailers and customers, accompanied with ethno-
graphic observations, at a range of private-sector medicine outlets; a
further 20 ‘non-transaction interviews’ plus 20 key-informant inter-
views with regulators in Cape Coast and Accra.
Medicine outlets were selected purposively, to reflect the observed
variation in type, urban/rural location, and proximity to other (com-
peting) outlets. The sample comprised: pharmacies (N= 35), licensed
over-the-counter (OTC) medicine shops (N=80), general stores
stocking medicines (N=27) and marketplaces (N= 58). Many outlets
sold both pharmaceutical and herbal medicines, but this paper focuses
on pharmaceuticals only.
In each outlet, the researcher began by requesting the retailer's
permission to be in the store (or stand by the market stall) and ex-
plained that we were interested in the medicines customers were
buying and why they were choosing these particular products.
Researchers made detailed observational notes on the store (general
conditions, set-up, range of medicines sold, etc.) and interviewed the
retailer(s) about the business (who owned the store, how long it had
been operating, stocking decisions, etc.). Every interaction with custo-
mers was observed and detailed notes taken on the conversation and
what (if any) medicine was sold.
Immediately after any transaction, we requested an interview with
both customer and retailer about the purchase. These ‘post-transaction
interviews’ were open-ended and conversational. Customers were
prompted to explain why they had chosen to buy that particular medicine
from that particular outlet, and what kinds of considerations influenced
their purchasing decision. Retailers were asked about why they had
sold that particular medicine, their discussion with the customer prior
to the purchase, and their views on medicine quality. Interviewers were
careful not to ask about trust specifically but to probe whenever the
interviewee brought up issues of trust or uncertainty. On average, in-
terviews lasted 30–45min, depending on interviewees' willingness and
availability.
The combination of interview and observational data enabled us to
cross-check and verify interviewees' accounts and practices. In order to
mitigate possible observer effects (for example, a retailer being more
attentive or following dispensing protocols more strictly than usual),
researchers spent two or 3 day at each outlet, remaining as unobtrusive
as possible. We observed a great many ‘unconventional’ dispensing
practices that lead us to believe that our presence did not affect beha-
viour very much but, of course, this remains a possible limitation of the
study.
Additional ‘non-transaction interviews’ (N= 20) were conducted in
smaller rural settlements with no functioning medicine outlet. Using
purposive sampling, these interviews enabled us to capture the ex-
periences of people whose access to medicines was particularly limited
and who may not have purchased pharmaceutical medicines recently.
In practice, however, it was rare to encounter someone who did not
purchase or consume pharmaceutical medicines altogether: decisions
were mostly about when, what and where, not whether.
Data analysis followed the principles of Grounded Theory.
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Theoretical insight emerges from the data through an iterative process
of close-reading, coding and testing of nascent hypotheses through
subsequent fieldwork (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). In the first cycle, data
were coded descriptively according to type of medicines bought/sold,
outlet type, and considerations influencing purchasing/retail decisions.
In the second cycle, the codes were then condensed and integrated into
broader and more coherent categories and themes that led to identifi-
cation of the mechanisms discussed in this paper. The quotations
throughout this paper are illustrative of the wider sample's responses.
Ethical approval was granted by Oxford University's Social Sciences
& Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee (UK);
Durham University's Anthropology Ethics Committee (UK); and the
University of Cape Coast Institutional Review Board (Ghana). All names
have been changed and some other details modified to protect anon-
ymity. Informed consent was sought verbally from each participant
before commencing data collection (observations and interviews). We
were mindful that some customers might be anxious to leave quickly
after purchasing a medicine; consequently, some interviews were short
and/or curtailed, but we always put the needs/wishes of the inter-
viewee first. Most people, however, were eager to share their experi-
ences, generating a rich dataset.
3. Results
3.1. Perceiving and experiencing uncertainty in medicine quality
Luhmann (2017) has argued that trust-based decision-making oc-
curs only if there is an awareness of risk or uncertainty of outcome. Our
interview data indicated very clearly that research participants, in both
rural and urban areas, perceived a high degree of uncertainty about the
quality and efficacy of the medicines available in private-sector outlets.
First, research participants talked about ‘fake’ medicines, deliber-
ately manufactured with little/no active ingredient for financial gain –
a perception fuelled by reports on television, radio and local public
address systems. ‘Fake medicines’ were believed to be ineffective, with
the potential to cause significant harm:
‘Once I bought a medicine and, when I poured it, it had such a bad smell.
When I took it, my body reacted [badly] to it – it was a really bad
experience. I checked again and it had not expired. I believe it was a fake
medicine. […] I was so terrified that I could have died.’ [48y man,
rural]
Expired or otherwise deteriorated medicines were a second source
of anxiety, especially in rural areas where medicines are said to ‘hang
around’ on shop shelves and/or be stored incorrectly. Many research
participants worried about taking ‘spoiled medicines’ which were
widely seen to be ‘poisonous and harmful’, [25y man, rural].
Finally, some consumers were worried about getting the wrong
medicine (irrespective of inherent quality). In resource-constrained
contexts like Ghana, where diagnostic equipment is scarce, treatment is
typically symptom-based and diagnosis by treatment (‘trying out’:
Whyte, 2005:249) remains the norm. (Even Rapid Diagnostic Tests for
malaria were rarely used by our research participants.) The risk of
misdiagnosis and mis-prescription is therefore high, particularly for
aetiologically-distinct diseases with similar symptoms (e.g. malaria,
typhoid and urinary-tract infections). Some interviewees also spoke
about unscrupulous vendors who would sell unnecessary or in-
appropriate medicines, just to ‘make business.’
A perception of uncertainty about medicine quality extended to
some retailers we interviewed, although they rarely shared their doubts
with customers. For example, Joseph, an Accra-based pharmacist, said
he struggled to differentiate between ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ medicines
sold by local distributors (an issue we return to later). Others worried
that medicines might deteriorate before reaching their shops. For ex-
ample, Hawa, another Accra-based pharmacist, told us that, ‘Even when
medicine [like insulin] comes packaged in ice, maybe it hasn't always been
stored in ice – maybe they just add the ice for show when they are delivering
it.’
In summary, both end-user customers and retailers perceived risks
and uncertainties around medicine quality and, for many, this caused
significant anxiety and concern. We now turn to the question of how
this perceived uncertainty is managed.
3.2. Mitigating uncertainty: seeking observable signs of quality
Consumers face a dilemma: they need (or believe they need) med-
icine to get better, but they cannot observe directly a medicine's con-
tents or quality. Our data show that buyers make multiple assessments
of the appearance of both the medicine and the retail outlet, in a
manner reminiscent of the WHO advice. We identified seeking ob-
servable signs of quality as a mechanism underpinning the assessment
trustworthiness.
3.2.1. Checking the medicine
Buyers sought reassurance by inspecting the medicine. Younger,
better-educated ones like James said that they checked medicine expiry
dates before purchasing any medicine. Some showed us how they
scrutinise the packaging and information leaflet for indicators of official
certification, checking for inconsistencies indicating possible fraud.
Customers with lower levels of literacy scrutinised the colours and
images on packaging: ‘If I am given something with a different shape,
package or colour, I will suspect it is fake.’ [34y woman, urban].
For unpackaged medicines, widely sold in smaller and informal
outlets, the appearance, feel and taste of the medicine become im-
portant. Poor-quality pills were generally thought to have a faded ap-
pearance and/or a crumbly texture:
‘For medicines that I have been using for a very long time, like para-
cetamol, I press to see how hard or soft it is. If the medicine is very hard,
that means it has not expired but if it is soft that means it has kept long at
the shop – not necessarily that it has expired but I need to be careful with
it. […] Life is the most precious gift so I don't joke with it for me or my
family’ [22y woman, rural]
Interviewees sought to reduce uncertainty and maximise ‘potency’
by preferring to buy medicines apparently originating from Europe or
North America rather than ‘local’ ones (Mackintosh and Mujinja, 2010;
Mujinja et al., 2014). Interviewees tended to be particularly suspicious
of certain Asian-manufactured generics:
‘I buy medicines from any country except China. China is well noted for
fake things so the likelihood of them producing fake medicines is also
high; I don't trust Chinese products' [27y woman, peri-urban].
Buyers generally believed that price was a good proxy for quality:
‘Usually, the good medicines are expensive – the better the medicine, the
higher the price’ [48y woman, peri-urban]. This interviewee told us that
she avoided the cheapest products where possible but she, like many,
could not afford an expensive branded medicine and so was buying a
mid-range anti-malarial when we met her.
Similar strategies were used by retailers attempting to manage un-
certainty in medicines they were purchasing, and concomitant risks (to
their businesses and/or their customers' wellbeing). Several described
in detail the checks that informed their purchasing decisions; just like
their customers, these included scrutinising external and internal
packaging, opening packets and assessing the colour and texture of
medicines, etc. Also, like their customers, they were wary of very cheap
medicines; as one OTC shop owner put it, ‘When I know the price of a
medicine and then someone comes with one that is extremely cheap, I be-
come suspicious.’
3.2.2. Scrutinising the outlet
Again in line with WHO advice, many interviewees tried to reduce
uncertainty by sourcing their medicines from ‘trusted and licensed
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outlets’, preferring licensed pharmacies because: “Their medicines are
more likely to be purchased from authorised manufacturers so safety is as-
sured … I believe they will have done their checks well.’ [26y woman,
urban]. OTC medicine shops and general stores were often thought to
stock poorer quality medicines: ‘When I see those chemical [OTC] shops,
my feeling is that they could be engaging in some fraudulent stuff and their
medicines may be fake,’ said one man (31y, urban).
Customers generally favoured well-established, popular outlets,
reasoning that such establishments would not wish to risk reputational
damage. Size and location also mattered: interviewees generally be-
lieved that large, centrally located establishments would find it more
difficult to get away with selling dubious medicines than smaller, more
‘hidden’ ones:
‘Bigger shops, the probability they will sell fake medicines is very minimal
compared to ones in the village. They have invested a lot – it is a sign they
have in mind to do good business.’ [22y woman, rural]
Some also assumed that large shops have a more rapid turnover of
stock, thereby reducing the risk of medicines deteriorating. For similar
reasons, prospective customers scrutinised the general conditions and
medicine storage facilities in a shop: ‘It is a big pharmacy and their
medicines are stored in a very good condition, at the right temperature so
that the potency of medicines is not compromised’ [24y woman, rural].
Buyers also felt more confident in the abilities of smartly dressed,
professional-looking staff who spoke knowledgeably in a pre-sales dis-
cussion:
‘You can talk to them to see that the person has been trained. If I talk to
you and see that you have not been trained, I will not buy from you
because it can be dangerous. I may have headache and you give me
medicine for stomach-ache. You can tell by the detail they go into when
they talk whether they have been trained’ [20y man, rural].
3.3. Addressing informational asymmetry
Positioned at the end of the supply chain, buyers have less in-
formation about the quality and provenance of the medicine than those
operating ‘higher up’. Addressing this informational asymmetry,
through garnering additional information from other actors, was a
second mechanism underpinning many buyers' assessments of trust-
worthiness.
3.3.1. Reputation and popularity
Faced with a lack of reliable information about quality, many
people took into account a medicine's reputation and popularity. As
well as drawing on experiences of those within their personal social
networks, many interviewees paid attention to media coverage, espe-
cially popular radio call-in shows:
‘Most medicines that come to the market have advertisements, and you
can listen to the advert. If they are advertising a lot and people are calling
in – at least three people, say – to testify that it has worked for them, you
know the medicine is very good.’ [20y man, rural]
Length of time on the market was also considered a proxy for
quality, although this interviewee added the caveat: ‘There are times
when a medicine becomes so popular and there is a higher demand for it,
some fraudulent people capitalise on it to produce some fake ones in the
market.’ [28y man, rural]. This reasoning also extends to buyers re-
peatedly purchasing the same brand of medicines and rejecting alter-
native brands or even the same brand packaged differently. Some came
to the shops with empty packets, bottles and blister packs asking for
exactly the same thing (see also Ecks and Basu, 2014). The habitual
practice of taking the same medicine reduced feelings of uncertainty
based on the reasoning that if it worked before, then it will probably
work again. This “embodied experience” (Rodrigues, 2016) provided
interviewees with crucial information about the ‘compatibility’ between
the medicine and the person (Whyte et al., 2002).
Supplier reputation is also important to retailers, especially when
sourcing from local manufacturers. One OTC retailer explained his
choice:
‘Because they are nationwide acclaimed pharmaceutical companies. […]
All their drugs are FDA certified, so they are of high quality. There has
never been a case where they were involved in any fraudulent activity like
selling fake drugs.’
3.3.2. Seeking information from staff
During our ethnographic work, we observed buyers seeking to
bridge the information gap by asking the sellers to recommend medi-
cines and for advice on storage and dosage. These conversations hap-
pened more often in pharmacies but not exclusively so. Interviewees
spoke passionately about their desire for information and their frus-
tration at being served by those with little experience or knowledge of
the medicines they were selling. As one male customer put it, ‘A small
boy cannot talk and explain things to me!’ Another said of his village OTC
shop: ‘He leaves the shop for the wife to take control. The wife does not
know much about the drugs. At times if you mention the drug, she will ask
you to come in and show her’ [40y, man, rural].
3.4. Buyer vulnerability and the limits of cognitive-based assessment
Despite assiduous attempts on the part of many buyers to mitigate
uncertainty, many recognised the inadequacy of using observable
proxies to determine medicine quality – and their ability to act on this
information. Many of our interviewees expressed deep concerns about
their vulnerability: “At times I fear for our lives” said one man.
For example, an expiry date can only reveal that, according to the
label, the medicine is in-date. It gives no information about ingredients,
production quality, storage conditions, or indications for particular
symptoms. Expiry dates, like signs of official accreditation, can be fal-
sified:
‘These days in Ghana, anything is possible. You just have to pay some-
thing to corrupt officials and they'll do whatever you want. […] A person
can just take a certificate from someone else and copy it – nobody would
know.’ [27y man, rural]
For many, the opportunities to act on assessments of (un)trust-
worthiness are also limited. For example, James is unemployed: with
minimal disposable income, finding the bus fare to travel to town is
difficult. Even if he does not really trust them, he has to make do with
the medicines available locally. As the Assemblyman of James’ village
noted:
‘People use the peddlers even though their drugs are more likely to be
expired than the drug store because they are cheaper and accessible –
they come to people's homes. If it's not for the peddlers and the drug store
is shut, they have to go to town, which is expensive.’
Even the “embodied experience” (Rodrigues, 2016) of taking med-
icine could not fully close the information gap. The relationship be-
tween taking a medicine and getting better is not straightforward.
Widespread polypharmacy, combined with placebo effects and the
natural progression of an illness make it difficult to ascribe therapeutic
failure to medicine quality. There is also a widely-held belief in Ghana
that medicines are ‘personal’ – particular medicines work for particular
people and not for others (Whyte et al., 2002), further stymieing in-
ferences about a medicine's trustworthiness, even after the event.
3.5. Blind trust?
In contrast to the assiduous checking and information seeking ob-
served in many cases, other participants bought medicines very quickly,
completing the transaction in seconds. These buyers did not scrutinise
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medicines or ask searching questions; nor did they appear to be any less
vulnerable than those who did.
Other researchers have grappled with the puzzle of why individuals
might appear to trust ‘blindly’, even when they may have good reason
to doubt. Based on work in post-socialist Slovakia, Torsello (2008) ar-
gued that if conditions are sufficiently bad, it can make sense to trust
people known (or suspected) to be untrustworthy, because the con-
sequences of not trusting can be worse than trusting and being betrayed.
Haas (2016) identified a different reason for ‘trusting the un-
trustworthy’ in Mongolia, where the act of trusting is a moral one,
bestowing a moral imperative on the recipient to act in a trustworthy
manner.
When someone is acutely sick, there are strong practical, economic
and emotional pressures to act. With limited options, buyers may have
to accept a lower threshold of trustworthiness than might otherwise be
the case. As Gambetta (1988:223) put it, ‘We may have to trust blindly,
not because we do not or do not want to know how untrustworthy
others are, but simply because the alternatives are worse’. This is not
quite ‘dependency (Meyer and Ward, 2013) or ‘reliance’ (Hart, 1988):
there is always an option to forego the pharmaceutical sector altogether
and turn to herbal preparations, faith healing or do nothing at all and
hope for the best. But, where pharmaceutical transactions do occur,
careful scrutiny and probing questions may be pointless if the only
option is to buy whatever is stocked in the local store.
3.6. Vulnerability and socially embedded trust
Over half of our interviewees were making a repeat visit to the
medicine outlet, often frequenting the same store over many years.
Their purchases had become socially embedded: inter-personal ex-
changes drawing on both economic and social ties, reinforced over
time. In these cases, buyers were attempting to alleviate their vulner-
ability by invoking an affective basis for trust, entailing ‘emotional
bonds and obligations generated through repeated interaction, empathy
and identification with the other's desires or intentions' (Gilson,
2003:1456). For example, Efua, an elderly woman based in Cape Coast,
trusts a particular dispenser who has worked at the OTC shop for a long
time and whom she assumes will have acquired considerable knowl-
edge. More important, though, is the personal relationship they have
developed: if she happens to be unavailable, Efua prefers to wait or
return another time rather than see someone else.
In other cases, social connections between buyer and seller precede
the economic relationship and emanate elsewhere: through kinship,
enduring friendship or connections from church, school or another
third party. Once the relationship is established, and repeated trans-
actions have occurred, the impetus to address uncertainty and in-
formational asymmetry diminishes:
‘I don't check anything on the medicine before buying it from this shop. I
just come to buy. She [seller] is good, honest so I know she will not sell
bad drugs to me.’ [38y man, urban]
Where trust is socially embedded, buyers are inclined to give the
retailer the benefit of the doubt, even when presented with possible
evidence to the contrary: ‘If it is like this place where I have been buying all
the time and never had any problem, I will not be disappointed [if a medicine
turned out to be ineffective] because it may be a mistake.’ [35y woman,
urban]. Trusting, even when there is reason to doubt, reinforces the
relationship and intensifies the moral obligation to be trustworthy
(Haas, 2016). Having established a relationship, it only makes sense to
quit if the actor believes strongly that they could do better elsewhere,
especially given the investment of time and effort needed to build a new
relationship. Similar considerations underpin the purchasing decisions
of some retailers. Constrained by resource limitations and aware that
they cannot eliminate uncertainty and informational asymmetry, it
makes sense to stick to a single supplier with whom they have estab-
lished a relationship.
Where trust is socially embedded, and/or where it emanates from
feelings of desperation, it may not just be unnecessary (or pointless) to
scrutinise and ask questions; it may be counterproductive. Where the
buyer has no option than to buy what is available, it may be psycho-
logically easier not to look too carefully (Gambetta, 1988: 224).
Moreover, where purchases are embedded in strong economic and so-
cial ties, suspicious behaviour (excessive checking or asking too many
probing questions) may undermine moral and social relations and da-
mage a long-term relationship with future negative consequences:
“You see the truth is that the man is good but at times he drinks, so when
he drinks his mood swings … But I am not just his customer, we also
attend the same church. If I don't buy from him, he will tell our pastor.
Moreover as a fellow church member, I have to buy from him so that his
business will boom. I don't have any option than to buy from him.” [40
yr, man, rural].
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we show how Ghanaians in our sample attempt to
assess the trustworthiness of medicine at the point of transaction in a
context of perceived high uncertainty and relatively low regulation. In
the opening vignette, James tries to mitigate uncertainty by scrutinising
the medicine for observable signs of quality – a widespread practice
among our sample. Others sought to close the information gap by
seeking as much information as possible about medicines before pur-
chasing.
However, these cognitive-based calculations of trustworthiness are
of limited utility, especially in situations of extreme poverty, constraint
or desperation, where the choice may be to take whatever is available
or do nothing at all. To deal with this, some interviewees embedded
their transactions within enduring social and economic relationships. In
these cases, trust has a relational and affective basis, which risks being
undermined by the cognitive-based approaches of scrutiny and in-
formation seeking. In Ghana, such relationships form the basis of many
commercial transactions (see, for example, the work of Lyon et al.,
2000, 2006 on tomato farmers). Engaging in repeat transactions over
long periods gives each party the opportunity to learn about the other,
and the expectation of future interactions produces a strong incentive to
cooperate.
Our analysis concurs with the work of others who highlight the
importance of affective bases for forming trust when cognitive me-
chanisms are inadequate (Gilson, 2003; Tibandebage and Mackintosh,
2005: 1385; Brhlikova et al., 2011; Ecks and Basu, 2014). Of course, the
cognitive/affective distinction is not a simple and stable binary; nor
does purchasers’ behaviour fall unambiguously into one category or
another. In reality, many people base their assessments of trust-
worthiness on a fragile balance of the two approaches that may shift
over time as circumstances change. Nonetheless, these distinctions have
heuristic value, helping us to understand how people in Ghana manage
the unenviable situation of transacting and consuming medicines when
uncertainties and stakes are very high.
However, even the affective relationships cannot eliminate un-
certainty: they can only make it more manageable (Samimian and
Rabinow, 2015; Widger, 2017; Zin, 2016). Without expensive equip-
ment and expert knowledge, no one can accurately distinguish a high-
quality medicine from a poor-quality one. Unlike the tomato farmers
described by Lyon (2000, 2006), who know with certainty about the
quality of their own products, medicine sellers – from itinerant peddlers
to high-end licensed pharmacists – cannot be certain. No matter how
strong and embedded the bond of trust, the retailer-customer (or
wholesaler-retailer) relationship is just one link in complex, interwoven
global supply chains, where no one has full information (Tremblay,
2013; Mackintosh et al., 2018, 2018). Just one ‘weak link’ can result in
a poor-quality medicine as Joseph, the pharmacist, explained:
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‘The issue of sourcing medicines here is very complex because there
are not specific supply chains. There are so many wholesalers. […]
The combination of a complex supply chain and lack of regulation
makes it more or less impossible to be sure about medicine quality.’
We should not forget why it is that medicine sellers and buyers in
Ghana (and many other LMICs) have to make do with such imperfect
strategies. Elizabeth Cooper (2015) reminds us that uncertainty is pri-
marily not a ‘cultural’ issue but a political and economic one, rooted in
inequitable control over resources, including knowledge. In Ghana, the
uneven distribution of knowledge and resources renders some people
more vulnerable than others to potential harms resulting from poor
quality medicines. At a global level, deep geopolitical inequities that,
for decades, have been mapped onto access to essential medicines
(Greene, 2011) re-emerge in the form of new risks and uncertainties
around medicine quality. While our focus has been the pragmatic
management of uncertainty, this must not detract from the need to
recognise and address the underlying power inequities that perpetuate
this situation.
Practically, there have been many attempts by national and inter-
national agencies to stem the global circulation of poor-quality medi-
cines, addressing both the demand side (through tighter regulation,
better reporting mechanisms and more effective enforcement) and the
supply side (through public and clinician education) (Hamilton et al.,
2016; WHO, 2017a). However, the problem persists. We suggest that
policy-makers and regulators have paid insufficient attention to what
actually happens when medicines are transacted and how people come to
make the decisions they do – often in less-than-ideal circumstances. There
are clearly no quick fixes: the large sums of money at stake, combined
with under-resourced regulatory systems and high unmet demand for
essential medicines, make the problem of poor-quality medicines a
particularly intractable one. However, a clear understanding of what
actors are actually doing and thinking, rather than relying on untested
assumptions, is a good starting point. This will require careful ethno-
graphic research, not just at the end-points of supply chains but all the
way up as actors navigate uncertainty with different motivations,
constraints and exigencies.
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